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INTERESTS OF AMICUS UTAH COUNCIL ON VICTIMS OF CRIME
The Utah Council on Victims of Crime is the statewide agency charged with
promoting the rights of crime victims in the state. Chaired by Reed M. Richards, Esq., it is
comprised of more than 20 members from diverse agencies and backgrounds. The Council
is concerned that an independent state exclusionary rule suppresses reliable evidence against
dangerous criminals, thus helping them to escape punishment and revictimize victims. The
Council has been involved in legislative efforts to eliminate the state exclusionary rule since
1993.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. The[jsGi] Court should revisit the issue of whether article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution contains an exclusionary rule. The issue has never been fully briefed before the
Court and the decision announcing the existence of an exclusionary rule {State v. Thompson,
810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1991)), miscited controlling precedent on the issue.
II. Utah's constitutional history and traditions reject a state exclusionary rule.
Nothing in the text of article I, section 14, suggests that evidence should be suppressed, a
conclusion reached by this Court in State v. Aime, 220 P. 704 (1923). Moreover, article I,
section 14 is separate from the trial-related criminal procedure provision of the Utah
Constitution. In addition, when the Utah Constitution was drafted, no appellate court in any
state had excluded unlawfully obtained evidence under its constitution - a common-law
approach that Utah's Constitution presumably tracked. Finally, the first Utah legislature

created its own remedies for violations of the search and seizure provisions - remedies that
did not include the suppression of reliable evidence.
III. Contemporary attitudes in Utah are against an independent state exclusionary
rule. The State's elected representatives have clearly voted against excluding reliable
evidence in 1982 and 1994.
IV. Other states that have created an independent state exclusionary rule have
frequently done so on the basis of their own unique state constitutional language or practice.
These precedents are therefore of little relevance to construing Utah's search and seizure
provision.
V.

An independent state exclusionary rule is poor public policy.

First, an

independent exclusionary rule creates litigation that complicates search and seizure, rather
than simplifying it as was the original aim. See State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 527 (Ariz. 1984)
("one of the few things worse than a single exclusionary rule is two different exclusionary
rules."). Second, an independent state exclusionary rule is unlikely to deter illegal police
activity. It will apply only in situations where the United States Supreme Court has upheld the
police activity in question, circumstances unlikely to produce deterrence. Third, the state
exclusionary rule will operate only in situations where its application is a disproportionate
response to the violation of a constitutional right. It will operate only in situations where
reasonable minds can differ - i.e., only in situations where at least five Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court have found the police practice at issue to be reasonable. And yet it requires
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the suppression of reliable evidence, even where that evidence is necessary to convict a
guilty criminal to prevent him from victimizing others.
ARGUMENT
L

THIS COURT SHOULD REVISIT THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
CONTAINS AN EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
This Court has effectively interpreted Utah's prohibition of unreasonable searches and

seizures — article I, section 14 — as containing its own exclusionary rule that operates
independently of the federal exclusionary rule. The way in which that law has developed,
however, warrants reexamination of that conclusion.
The existence of an independent state exclusionary rule was first suggested by two
justices of this Court in State v. Larocco, 19A P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). The two-justice
plurality opinion did not command a majority of the Court. Yet in spite of that fact, this full
Court then apparently assumed that Larocco was controlling law a year later in State v.
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1991), when it inaccurately cited the Larocco plurality
opinion without noting that it was not controlling authority. See 810 P.2d at 419 (citing
plurality opinion without designating it as a plurality opinion). The Thompson opinion
contains only a single sentence on this critical issue - a single sentence that simply (mis)cites
the Larocco plurality as controlling authority on the existence of a state exclusionary rule.
Because of the cursory treatment of the issue, it appears that Thompson may have
overlooked early Utah Supreme Court decisions contradicting the Larocco plurality's
suggestion that Utah has its own exclusionary rule. In State v. Aime, 220 P. 704 (1923), this

3

Court unanimously held that article I, section 14 did not permit the suppression of reliable
evidence. This Court observed that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Weeks
(creating a federal exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment) was "not binding on state
courts in interpreting similar provisions of their own state Constitutions." 220 P. at 705-06.
This Court quoted extensively from the opinions of state courts and Wigmore's evidence
treatise to the effect that "[t]he judicial rules of evidence were never meant to be an indirect
process of punishment." Id. at 705. And, noted this Court, "The law cannot be justly
administered without a knowledge of the facts in dispute. The purpose of evidence is to
establish the truth in legal tribunals, in order that justice may be done." Id. at 707. This Court
therefore held: "With the profoundest respect for the high tribunal which has reached a
contrary conclusion, we are led by the force of what we deem the better reason to conclude
with the vast majority of state courts that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the
illegality of means through which it has been obtained." Id. at 708. *
Thirty-seven years later, this Court reaffirmed Aime on the eve of the Mapp decision.
In State v. Fair, 3 53 P.2d 615,615 (Utah 1960), this Court followed Aime, holding that "[i]t is
not necessary to determine whether or not the search was legal, because this court has
previously held that evidence, even though illegally obtained, is admissible."

Interestingly, one of the members of the unanimous Aime Court was Samuel R.
Thurman, who as a delegate to the Utah Constitutional Convention was actively involved in
discussions on the provisions of article I and on the responsibilities of the state judiciary.
Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under
State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 U T A H L . REV. 751, 790.
4

After Mapp, this Court followed in "lockstep" with federal law in applying a state
exclusionary rule. So none of these decisions is particularly instructive on what the state
constitutional history and traditions mean. See Larocco, 19A P.2d at 471 (plurality opinion)
(Utah Supreme Court followed the federal lead "somewhat grudgingly"). The most that can
be said of these cases is that they "implicitly]" recognized a state exclusionary rule. See id,
at 472 (plurality opinion). Because of this lack of any explicit consideration of the issue, the
unanimous 1923 Aime opinion — which was reaffirmed in Fair in 1960 and not questioned
by even a single justice on the Utah Supreme Court as a matter of state constitutional law
until 1990 -- would seem to be entitled to special deference. Yet that deference was not
given when this Court created a state exclusionary rule in Thompson without any discussion
of the issue.
Amicus Utah Council on Victims of Crime respectfully requests this opportunity to
provide full briefing to the Court (with, of course, a response from the appellant) on the
important issue of whether Utah's Constitution requires the suppression of reliable evidence
when it has been obtained by law enforcement agents who have followed federal
constitutional requirements. To be sure, Thompson makes an independent exclusionary rule
the current law of the state. But the Utah Council on Victims respectfully submits that,
through this brief, it can clearly establish that this decision establishing the independent state
exclusionary rule is "erroneous . . . and that more good than harm will come by departing

2

See Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 751, 784-88 (reviewing these cases and
concluding that they "fail to provide analytical support for an independent state exclusionary
rule").
5

from [the] precedent." State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ^ 11, 67 P.3d 477, 481 (Utah 2003).
Indeed, this Court has overruled a prior precedent when the earlier precedent "not only failed
to explain why [it] was abandoning the long-established [previous] rule .. but failed to cite
that line of cases altogether." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994). Thompson
miscited Larocco as controlling law and thus failed to explain why it was adopting an
independent state exclusionary rule that had been rejected in Utah since the State's founding.
Reconsideration of the state exclusionary rule question is appropriate for one
additional reason: In neither Thompson nor Larocco did the Court receive full briefing on the
issue of whether article I, section 14 contains an exclusionary rule. In Larocco, appellant
Larocco did not provide any briefing to support an independent exclusionary rule, simply
assuming that exclusion of evidence was part of article I, section 14. Similarly, in
Thompson, none of the briefs substantively discussed the state exclusionary rule (or even
cited State v. Larocco, for that matter).
The issue of an independent state exclusionary rule is an important one that deserves
careful consideration from this Court - after full and fair briefing from interested groups,
such as the Utah Council on Victims of Crime. The Court should therefore consider the
question. It should conclude that suppression of reliable evidence is not a permissible
remedy for violations of article I, section 14 and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial
court on this alternative ground. See Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, f 31, 171
P.3d 442, 450 (affirming judgment on alternate ground).

6

II.

UTAH'S CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND TRADITIONS REJECT
A STATE EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
The conventional tools for proper state constitutional interpretation have been set out

at length in other opinions and include such things as constitutional text, drafting history,
contemporary understandings, structural analysis of the Constitution, and contemporary
public attitudes. See generally American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 140
P.3d 1235 (Utah 2006). All of these conventional interpretive tools point against a state
exclusionary rule. See generally Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and
Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAHL.
REV.

751.
A. The Text of Article I Section 14 Does Not Support An Exclusionary Rule.
When interpreting the state's constitution, this Court "look[s] first to the plain

meaning of the constitutional provision at issue." State v. Willis, 2004 Utah 93, \ 4,100 P.3d
1218, 1219 (Utah 2004). Like the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 14 makes no
reference to the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for a violation. As this Court explained in
Aime, "no authority, so far as we have been able to discover, has suggested that the
subsequent use of articles [illegally] taken as evidence is in itself any part of the unlawful
invasion of such constitutional guaranty." Aime, 220 P. at 706 (internal quotation omitted).
In response, one might argue that because the United States Supreme Court has
adopted the exclusionary rule to deter violation of the Fourth Amendment, the parallel
provision of article I, section 14 likewise contains such a rule. But such an approach is
essentially an argument for "lockstep" interpretation of the federal and Utah constitutions, an

7

interpretative approach a majority of this Court has rejected in other contextS[jsG2]. See Brf.
of Aple at 7-8. Moreover, the federal exclusionary rule no longer rests on a constitutional
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the Supreme Court now views the rule as a
"judicially-created remedy." See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995). The Utah
Constitution creates a sharper division of powers, see Utah Const., Art. V, which means that
this Court does not have the same sort of free-ranging remedial powers as the U.S. Supreme
Court. See generally Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. at 827-33.
In addition, differences between the federal and Utah constitutional structures
likewise argue against a state exclusionary rule. The federal Bill of Rights contains trialrelated procedural provisions in at least two different amendments, the Fifth and the Sixth.
In contrast, the Utah Constitution concentrates the trial provisions in one section. The
section dealing with the rights of accused persons, article I, section 12, list various rights
(such as the right to counsel, right to confront witnesses, and the right to speedy trial). None
of the other sections of the Declaration of Rights contains trial-related procedural
provisions. It is reasonable to suppose that if the drafters of the search and seizure provision
had viewed it as creating a right of the "accused" applicable "[i]n criminal prosecutions,"
they would have incorporated the provision with the other trial-related rights in section 12.

1

UTAH CONST, art. I, § 5 guarantees the right to habeas corpus, a right not tied to
trial procedures. Similarly, pre-trial procedures are discussed in art. I, § 8 (bail) and art. I, §
13 (prosecution by indictment or information); post-trial procedures are discussed in art. I, §
9 (no "cruel or unusual punishments"). The Declaration of Rights also contains a general
due process clause, art. I, § 7, and a guarantee of the right to trial by jury, art. I, § 10.
8

B. The drafting history at the Utah Constitutional Convention provides no
support for an exclusionaiy rule
Review of the available materials strongly suggests that the framers of the Utah
constitution did not intend to create a state exclusionary rule. The records of the Utah
Constitutional Convention shed little direct light on the framers' intent in drafting article I,
section 14, as the Convention records from March 25,1895 reveal only that "Section 14 was
read and passed without amendment." 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 319 (1898) (recounting proceedings on March 25,1895). Nonetheless, other

considerations regarding the Convention's deliberations indicate that the framers did not
intend to exclude reliable evidence from criminal trials.
The inspiration behind the Declaration of Rights came from the federal Bill of Rights.

2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1847 (1898). However, it is
also widely recognized that the drafters of the Utah Constitution borrowed provisions from
other state constitutions. See John J. Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government ~ The
History of Utah's Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311, 324. Regardless of which
constitution was the model for article I, section 14,4 the judicial view in this country was
contrary to an exclusionary rule. Indeed, at the time the Convention considered article I,
section 14, no appellate court in any state excluded unlawfully obtained evidence under its
constitution. See Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. at 803; see also Lester J. Mazor, Notes
on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 326,346 (The development of

4

See Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. at 803 (arguing for Nevada's search and
seizure provision as the model).
9

the federal exclusionary rule did not have "an antecedent in the language of a single state
constitution, either as a result of amendment or the adoption of a new constitution"). Nor did
the U.S. Supreme Court exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
That did not occur until almost twenty years later, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). Moreover, at the time of the Utah Constitutional Convention, the common law rule
plainly admitted illegally-seized evidence. The United States Supreme Court, just a few
years after Utah's 1895 Convention, explained the common law rule as follows: "Evidence
which is pertinent to the issue is admissible, although it may have been procured in an
irregular or even in an illegal manner." Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 596 (1904);
accordRegina v. Leatham, [ 1861] 8 Cox C.C. 498,501 (Crompton, J.,) (no exclusionary rule
under English common law). See generally 24 A.L.R. 1408 (1923) (Annotation of the
admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure).
It is a standard rule of construction that legislators are aware of the common law and
that their handiwork, if ambiguous, should be construed to follow that approach. See
American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, If 49, 140 P.3d 1235, 1249 ("this
Court has often resorted to the common law in construing various provision in the Utah
Declaration of Rights"). The framers of the Utah constitution were well aware of common
law principles and incorporated them into their Constitution. For example, delegate Charles
S. Varian urged the convention to adopt language in article I, section 12 guaranteeing the
right to confront adverse witnesses that was "within the ancient landmarks, so that every
lawyer and every layman may know just what this does mean." 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE

10

UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

307-08 (1898). The ancient landmarks at issue here

would block the suppression of reliable evidence because of mere objections how the police
obtained it.5
C Article I Section 14 Is Not a Self-Executing Constitutional Provision
Article I, section 14 is not a "self-executing" constitutional provision in that it does
contain a specific remedy for violations of its provisions. Yet the framers of the Utah
Constitution were aware of the concept of "self-executing" constitutional provisions and knew
how to draft such enforcement provisions when desirable. See Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L.
REV. at 807-08. The reasonable inference is that the drafters designed article I, section 14 to
be enforced through means other than those contained in the constitution.
This conclusion is confirmed by the subsequent action of the first Utah legislature,
which provided specific criminal sanctions for unreasonable searches and seizures. The
legislature adopted a misdemeanor offense covering any "person who maliciously and
without probable cause shall procure a search warrant to be issued and executed . . . . "
REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH

§ 5101 (1898). The legislature also enacted a law that f,[a]

peace officer who, in executing a search warrant, shall willfully exceed his authority or
exercise it with unnecessary severity, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." Id., § 5102.
As for warrantless searches, another statute provided that "[e] very public officer... who under

5

It is sometimes argued that history of anti-polygamy raids in Utah provides a basis
for broadly interpreting art. I, § 14. The overwhelming difficulties with this position are
discussed in Paul G. Cassell, Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: The Irrelevance
of the Antipolygamy Raids, 1995 BYUL. REV.l.
11

the pretense or color of any process or other legal authority, arrests any person or detains him
against his will, or seizes or levies upon an> property, or dispossesses any one of any lands or
tenements, without a regular process or other lawful authority therefor, is guilty of a
misdemeanor." Id., § 4140. The legislature also adopted various criminal provisions that
could be applied to official misconduct.6
At the same time as the first legislature adopted these criminal penalties for
unreasonable searches and seizures, it did not create any right to exclude unlawfully obtained
evidence at trial. Instead, it provided that "the rules of evidence in civil actions shall be
applicable also to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided in this code." REVISED
STATUTES OF UTAH

§ 5012 (1898).The rules for civil actions contained no exclusionary rule.

See id., §§ 2851-3757. The specific rules for criminal actions likewise did not authorize the
exclusion of reliable evidence. The criminal rules were intended to be exhaustive: "All
forms of pleading in criminal actions, and the rules by which the sufficiency of such pleading
is to be determined, shall be those prescribed by this code." REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH §

6

Section 4691 provided that all state officers "not liable to impeachment" may be
prosecuted criminally. Section 4153 forbade the "willful omission to perform any duty
enjoined by law upon any public officer" and authorized a misdemeanor penalty. Section
4154 indicated that "where the performance of any act is prohibited by any statute, and no
penalty for the violation of such statute is imposed by any statute, the doing of such act is a
misdemeanor."
12

4728 (1898). The various pleadings concerning defenses that could be raised do not include
a motion for suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence.
To the extent that the rules adopted by the first legislature are silent on the existence
of an exclusionary rule, the "gap filling" provisions in the Utah statutes suggest that no such
rule existed. The first legislature provided that" [t]he common law of England, so far as it is
not repugnant to, or in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States, or the
constitution and laws of this state, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state."
REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH

§ 2488 (1898). As noted earlier, the common law approach

both in England and in this country was to admit relevant evidence even if illegally obtained.
The fact that the first Utah legislature created remedies for illegal searches has
important constitutional implications. Utah has a scheme of clearly defined governmental
responsibilities. Article V of the Utah Constitution divides the powers sharply:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Under this system of sharply separated power, remedial powers reside[jsG3] with the
Legislature. As this Court explained in an early decision, "The right and power, as well as
the duty, of creating rights to provide remedies, lies with the Legislature, and not with the

7

* See id., § 4770 (time to answer indictment or information "not less than one day"); §
4771 (when information must be set aside); § 4772 (when indictment must be set aside); §
4779 (grounds for demurring to an indictment); § 4799 (removal when impartial trial cannot
be had); § 4845 (order of trial); § 5012 (rules of evidence same as in civil cases).
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courts." Brown v. Wightman, 151 P. 366 (Utah 1915) (emphasis added). Moreover, any
asserted judicial capacity to create remedies is limited by questions of institutional
competence. As we discuss in Part V below, determining whether applying the exclusionary
rule is appropriate requires weighing the costs and benefits — the cost of lost convictions
against the benefit of deterring unconstitutional searches and seizures. It also requires a
substantive review of the availability and efficacy of other remedies for unconstitutional
searches.
Given Utah's scheme of sharply separated powers, evaluating the competing concerns
would seem to lie peculiarly within the province of the state legislature. The legislature has
shown a willingness to provide remedies in this area from the first days of statehood, and
nothing in this Court's opinions suggests that these actions were beyond the scope of
legislative power. But if such remedies are within legislative competence, by definition
under the Utah Constitution they are outside judicial competence.
III. CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC ATTITUDES REJECT AN INDEPENDENT STATE EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
From the above sources, it is clear that the intention of the drafters of the Utah
Constitution in 1895 was not to allow the suppression of reliable evidence under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

It is sometimes argued, however, that Utah's

Constitution should be construed in light of contemporary public attitudes. But see American
Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, % 57, 140 P.3d 1235, 1252 (construing Utah
Constitution's freedom of speech provisions based on historical understanding). For the sake
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of completeness, this part demonstrates that in recent years, Utah's elected representatives
have also rejected an exclusionary rule.
In 1982, the representatives of the citizens of the state overwhelmingly passed, and
the governor approved, the "Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act." Fourth Amendment
Enforcement Act of 1982, ch. 10,1982 Utah Laws 84 (codified in scattered sections of Utah
Code Ann). The Act created a civil cause of action against government agencies whose
employees violated protected Fourth Amendment rights. At the same time, section five of
the Act directly explained the legislature's intent to create a remedy for illegal searches that
would "stand in lieu of the exclusion of evidence in criminal cases for violation of
constitutionally protected rights except where those violations are substantial and peace
officers were not acting in good faith." UTAH CODE ANN. §78-16-1(1982). The legislative
history of the Act confirms that the legislature believed the exclusionary rule did not deter
O

Q

illegal searches while at the same time was an obstacle to justice. This Court ultimately
declared the Act unconstitutional because of various procedural problems under the federal
constitution. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987).

The chief sponsor of the bill explained that "[t]he studies which were presented to
the Interim Study Committee took the position and concluded . .. that the existing
mechanism does not deter violation of the Fourth Amendment." House debate on H.B. No.
69 (Jan. 30, 1982), record #14, side 1 (remarks of Rep. McKeachnie).
9

See House debate on H.B. No. 69 (Jan. 21,1982), record #2, side 1 (remarks of Rep.
McKeachnie) ("The consensus of the Judiciary Committee was that [the exclusionary rule] is
one of the largest loopholes to getting conviction of people who may be guilty of committing
crimes. It's really a technicality, and the bill is an attempt to overcome if).
15

In 1982, there was no state exclusionary rule and the Fourth Amendment Enforcement
Act was targeted at the federal exclusionary rule. After the independent state exclusionary
rule came into existence, amicus Utah Council on Victims of Crime asked its legislative
supporters to work for a state constitutional amendment that would abolish the state
exclusionary rule. In 1993, the result was Senate Joint Resolution No. 13, which passed the
Senate by a vote of 22-1. UTAH SENATE J. 50th Leg., at 454 (1994). In the House Judiciary
Committee, the argument was made that there was no need for legislative action in 1993, as
the earliest the voters could approve the measure would be next election year.

The

Resolution was therefore tabled. UTAH HOUSE J., 50th Leg., at 647 (1994). In 1994, Senate
Joint Resolution No. 1 was introduced. It provided in relevant part:
Except as specifically provided by statute hereafter enacted, no evidence
discovered in the course of a search or seizure shall be excluded under Article
I, Sec. 14, Utah Constitution from any criminal or civil proceeding or trial if
the search or seizure was conducted in conformity with standards, including
good faith standards, established under the United Sates Constitution.
With the support of Attorney General Jan Graham, the measure passed the Senate by a vote
of 24-4, UTAH SEN. J., 50th Leg., at 255-56 (1994), and the House Judiciary Committee by a
vote of 6-2. UTAH HOUSE J., 50th Leg., at 392 (1994). The measure, however, never
obtained a floor vote.
These legislative actions confirm that in recent years Utah's elected representatives
have not supported the suppression of reliable evidence in criminal proceedings, particularly
where law enforcement officers have followed federal constitutional standards in obtaining
the evidence.
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IV. THE PRACTICES OF OTHER STATES DO NOT SUPPORT AN
INDEPENDENT UTAH EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
This Court has also occasionally found it helpful to examine the interpretations of
other state courts in interpreting the Utah Constitution. Indeed, the Larocco plurality took
this approach, asserting that at the time the Supreme Court decided to impose a federal
exclusionary rule on the states inMappv. Ohio, 367U.S. 643 (1961), "more than half of [the
states] were already voluntarily applying" the exclusionary rule. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at
472 (plurality opinion) (citing Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651, which in turn cited an appendix in
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, Appendix, pp. 224-232 (I960)). Even assuming that
this calculation is correct - and it appears that, in fact, the majority were generally against
the rule10 — the fact remains that those decisions provide little analytic support for state
exclusionary rules. Many of those decisions simply followed the federal Weeks rule in
"lockstep,"11 an approach that this Court has eschewed in other contexts.
To bolster its argument, the Larocco plurality immediately added that "[a]t least
eighteen states have adopted an independent state exclusionary rule." 794 P.2d at 472
(plurality opinion). Setting aside the obvious rejoinder — 32 states have not adopted such a

,u

See Cassell, supra, at 1993 U T A H L . REV. at 793 n.272.

11

See, e g, Gore v. State, 218 P. 545, 547 (Crim. Ct. App. Okla. 1923) ("if it appears
that the highest court of the land has definitely fixed a rule applying to the introduction of
evidence obtained by illegal seizure, it follows without argument that the rule of evidence in
the state courts, where like facts and principles of law are involved, should conform to that
settled by the court having supreme prestige and authority."); State v. George, 231 P. 683,
684-85 (Wyo. 1924) (adopting federal rule because "[t]he Constitution of the United States
and the laws passed pursuant thereto govern the people of this state as much so as the
Constitution and law of this state").
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rule — this is tenuous support for a Utah exclusionary rule. To begin with, one can question
the necessity for looking outside the borders of the state to resolve a question of Utah law
where the Utah traditions are so clear. Moreover, many out-of-state decisions rest on
considerations that are inapplicable to Utah.
For example, the Louisiana exclusionary rule is based on unique language in the
Louisiana constitution, language not present in Utah's constitution. Article I, section 5 of the
Louisiana Constitution (adopted in 1974) provides, after reciting a general prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures: "Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure
conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the
appropriate court." This implicitly recognizes an exclusionary rule. See State v. Culotta,
343So.2d977,981(La. 1977).
Similarly, the Washington exclusionary rule rests on specific language in its
constitution and a drafting history behind that provision suggesting the appropriateness of a
broad interpretation. Article I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution provides: "No person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." In
drafting this provision, the Washington Constitutional Convention of 1889 specifically
declined to adopt the wording of the Fourth Amendment, preferring a broader formulation.
See State v. White, 640 P.2d 1061, 1071 (Wash. 1982).

' To be sure, many of the 32 states probably are following a lockstep approach to
interpreting their state constitutions. But in doing so, they are implicitly rejecting an
independent state exclusionary rule.
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The Hawaii exclusionary rule likewise rests on specific drafting history supporting an
exclusionary rule at the Hawaiian Constitutional Convention. See Hawaii v. Polini, 367 P.2d
499, 506 (Haw. 1961) (referring to Hawaii Constitutional Convention, Committee of the
Whole Report No. 5, 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention 301) (specifically
indicating intent to adopt federal decisions creating an exclusionary rule). No comparable
drafting history exists for Utah.
The Alaska exclusionary rule is based on a specific provision in the Alaska rules of
evidence requiring exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. See ALASKA R. EviD. 412
("Evidence illegally obtained shall not be used over proper objection by the defendant in a
criminal prosecution for any purpose [except for certain purposes in perjury prosecutions]");
see Marker v. Alaska^ 663 P.2d 932, 934 (Alaska 1983). In deciding search and seizure
issues, the Alaska courts have also relied on the unique "character of life in Alaska," Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494,504 (Alaska 1975), and on the Alaska Constitution's explicit protection
of a right of privacy, see ALASKA CONST, art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed"); see, e.g., State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 874-82
(Alaska 1978) (interpreting this provision). The Utah rules of evidence contain no such
provision and, indeed, provide exactly the opposite of the Alaska rule. See UTAH R. EVID.
402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules

")

(emphasis added). See generally Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. at 833-36 (discussing
how the Utah Rules of Evidence contradict an independent state exclusionary rule).
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Other states have adopted an independent state exclusionary rule without any careful
examination of the issues involved or their state's own history. A good illustration comes
from New York, where early twentieth century case law, including a well-known decision
penned by then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo? unambiguously rejected the exclusionary rule as a
matter of statutory and common law, as well as federal constitutional law. People v. Before,
242 N.Y. 13, 15, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926) ("There has been no
blinking the consequences.

The criminal is to go free because the constable has

blundered."). In 1938, a constitutional convention was held when a state constitutional
search and seizure provision was adopted. A proposal to engraft the exclusionary rule was
rejected. See People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 408-11 (1985) (Titone, J., concurring).
Nonetheless, in 1985 the New York Court of Appeals decided to adopt its own exclusionary
rule, thereby "amending the [New York] Constitution in a fashion explicitly rejected by the
delegates to the 1938 Constitutional Convention, and overruling three decisions sub
silentio"

Id. at 408. Such judicial fiat provides little useful precedent for this Court

interpreting the Utah Constitution; this Court has consistently recognized that the goal of
state constitutional analysis "is to discern the intent and purpose of both the drafters of our
constitution and, more importantly, the citizens who voted it into effect." American Bush v.
City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, at «jj 12, 140 P.3d at 1240.
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V.

AN INDEPENDENT STATE EXCLUSIONARY RULE CONSTITUTES
BAD PUBLIC POLICY.
The previous sections of this brief have established that Utah's history and traditions

stand opposed to an independent state exclusionary rule, as do the contemporary attitudes of
its elected officials. These conclusions should be enough to establish that, as a matter of
constitutional interpretation, there is no basis for an independent state exclusionary rule. For
the sake of completeness, however, this section explains why an independent state
exclusionary rule is bad public policy.
Of course, an assessment of an independent state exclusionary rule does not require
any revisitation of the on-going debate concerning the federal exclusionary rule. It is enough
for present purposes to note that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is generally
justified as a deterrent to unlawful police behavior. In the words of Mapp v. Ohio, "the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it."
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643; see Sims v. Collection Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d
6,14 (Utah 1992) (plurality opinion) (observing that "one of the frequently cited purposes of
the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful seizures"). On the other hand, critics of the
rule believe that any deterrent effect is unproven, the sanction of the rule is disproportionate
to the offense, and the costs of the rule (release of criminals because the "constable has
blundered," Before, 150 N.E. at 587 (Cardozo, J.).,) are too high, particularly in light of
alternative remedies (such as civil suits) that could be made available. See generally Dallin
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H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665,
678-754(1970).
Assuming arguendo that the justification for a federal exclusionary rule is a close call,
the additional considerations against extending the rule at the state level are more than
enough to tip the scales the other way. The Utah exclusionary rule is troublesome in at least
three respects: (A)[JSG4] the state exclusionary rule is inconsistent with the central premise of
the Larocco plurality opinion (the need to simplify search and seizure law); (B) the state
exclusionary rule is unlikely to produce any significant incremental deterrent effect beyond
that created by the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule; and (C) the state rule will typically
operate in situations where its effect is disproportionate to the constitutional violation at
hand.
A. An Independent State Exclusionary Rule is Inconsistent with Larocco fs
Purpose of Simplifying Search and Seizure Law
The germinal idea behind the Larocco plurality, first expressed in Justice Zimmerman's
concurrence in State v. Hygh, was the need to develop "simpler rules that can be more easily
followed by police officers and the courts." 711 P.2d 264,272 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring). Justice Durham expanded on this theme in her plurality opinion in Larocco,
concluding: "The time has come for this court, in applying an automobile exception to the
warrant requirement of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to try to simplify, if
possible, the search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily followed by the police
and the courts and, at the same time, provide the public with consistent and predictable
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protections against unreasonable searches and seizures." 794 P.2d at 469 (plurality opinion)
(emphasis added).
Far from simplifying the law, an independent exclusionary rule doubles the confusion.
The Arizona Supreme Court has pithily noted that "one of the few things worse than a single
exclusionary rule is two different exclusionary rules." State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519,527 (Ariz.
1984) (holding that Arizona's exclusionary rule is no broader than the federal exclusionary
rule); see also People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 825 (Colo. 1985) (Rovira, J., dissenting) ("The
law of search and seizure and the accompanying exclusionary rule is difficult enough to
apply with but one line of authority to follow — that of the United States Supreme Court. To
add a separate line of authority under the state constitution compounds the difficulty
immeasurably."); People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 284 (Cal. 1976) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting) ("The vagaries and uncertainties of constitutional interpretations, particularly in
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment sectors of our criminal law, are the hard facts of life with
which the general public, the courts, and law enforcement officials must grapple daily. This
condition necessarily breeds uncertainty, confusion, and doubt. It will not be eased or
allayed by a proliferation of multiple judicial interpretations of nearly identical language.");
John K. Van de Kamp & Richard W. Gerry, Reforming the Exclusionary Rule: Analysis of
Two Proposed Amendments to the California Constitution, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1109, 1121
(1982) (criticizing independent California decisions because "[tjhese two tiers of
constitutional interpretations can only complicate the police officer's task of understanding
what the law requires").
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The confusing effects of independent state standards enforced via a state exclusionary
rule become immediately apparent when one recognizes that Utah's law enforcement officers
are often involved in joint federal-state investigations and prosecutions. For example, the
official website for the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Utah describes "Utah
Project Safe Neighborhood" as a partnership "among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and prosecutors." http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ut/psn/index.html. Similarly,
"Project Safe Childhood" involves "participating State and local law enforcement agencies"
attacking internet crimes against children, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ut/psc/index.html.
Even apart from cases that directly involve federal law enforcement agencies, Utah's
law enforcement officers often wind up in federal court where only federal standards apply.
For example, many drug offenses investigated initially by state law enforcement agencies including in particular many traffic stops - are also prosecuted in federal court because of
stiff mandatory-minimum sentences prescribed for violations of federal drug laws. See
Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. at 838-40. The state officer making the stop, of course,
cannot be sure, at the time that search and seizure issues arise, whether the case will be
prosecuted in state or federal court. The flip side of this problem is when a federal law
enforcement officer applies for a search warrant in state court. "Federal drug agents cannot,
and should not, be expected to know the individual constitutional requirements in each and
every state. Because of the need for uniformity in the law, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court that directly affect interstate drug trafficking should be approached with
deference." See (Dates, 698 P.2d at 822 (Erickson, C.J., dissenting).
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Whatever one thinks of independent interpretation of state constitutional provisions,
clearly the "simplest" approach is not to create a state exclusionary rule. This would avoid
litigation over compliance with state constitutional provisions in criminal proceedings. In
response, it might be argued that a certain amount of complexity is a necessary incident of
interpreting state constitutions independently from the federal approach. Perhaps this
rejoinder is true, but the limited point here is that, from a public policy perspective,
simplification of search and seizure law would be promoted best by abolishing Utah's
independent exclusionary rule.
B. A State Exclusionary Rule is Unlikely to Generate an Incremental
Deterrent Effect Beyond the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
From a public policy perspective, it is also unclear what benefit comes from an
independent state exclusionary rule. Presumably the justification for such a rule is to deter
police misconduct. But the deterrent effect of a federal exclusionary rule is already highly
debatable. It seems to be clear that "[n]o one actually knows how effective the [federal]
exclusionary rule is as a deterrent." Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment,
1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 55. Then-Professor Dallin H. Oaks' study of the deterrent effect,
although conducted in the late 1960's, still remains the classic in the field and could not
demonstrate a deterrent effect. See generally Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).
Regardless of whether the federal exclusionary rule deters, however, claims about the
desirability of a state exclusionary rule must be evaluated against the backdrop of this federal
rule. Any suggestion that the absence of a state exclusionary rule will "turn the police loose"
25

to abuse citizens is demonstrably false because the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
which applies to all state prosecutions, remains in place regardless of how a state constitution
is interpreted.

In virtually all instances of abusive police conduct to which a state

exclusionary rule would apply, the Mapp exclusionary rule applies as well.
What is at issue in a state exclusionary rule debate is whether to extend the
exclusionary sanction to a limited subcategory of state constitutional violations: violations in
which officers offend the state constitution but not the federal constitution. The conditions
surrounding this subset of violations are extremely unlikely ones for deterrence.
To begin with, "[t]he deterrent effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is also dependent
upon whether the arrest and search and seizure rules that it is supposed to enforce are stated
with sufficient clarity that they can be understood and followed by common ordinary7 police
officers." Oaks, supra, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. at 731. Different state constitutional rules will, by
definition, be conflicting and uncertain, as they will conflict with federal constitutional
principles that the United States Supreme Court has announced. Justice Stewart articulated
the problem very nicely when he observed:
Indeed, in the context of state search and seizure law as applied in routine
traffic stops of vehicles, I have previously taken the position that this Court
ought not embroider the margins of an already highly complicated area of the
law by creating relatively insignificant departures from federal search and
seizure law simply because some comparatively minor aspect of that law
seems to be ill-founded or inconsistent with other federal law. Further
complicating an already extremely intricate and complex area of the law
would, in my view, not only have the adverse effect on law enforcement of
compounding confusion in that area of the law but, more importantly, it would
undermine the very liberty values that the search and seizure provisions of the
Utah and federal constitutions are designed to protect.

26

State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,1240 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
A good illustration of the problems comes from the Larocco case itself. In the
interests of "simplifying" the law, the Larocco plurality announced the requirement that
vehicle searches must be conducted pursuant to a warrant when practical Larocco, 19 A P.2d
at 469-70 (plurality opinion). The plurality, however, would allow warrantless searches
when justified by "exigent circumstances" such as the need "to protect the safety of police or
the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence." Id. at 470 (plurality opinion).
Assuming that the plurality opinion gains a third vote and becomes the law of the state
(another issue about which state law enforcement officers must speculate), development of
the precise contours of the "exigency" exception will likely take years of litigation. A
critical question is whether the relative mobility of a vehicle is itself enough of an
"exigency" to justify a warrantless search? If so, the exigency "exception" might swallow
the general "warrants when practicable" rule in the context of car searches. Yet the mobility
of vehicles has long been recognized as an "exigent" circumstance. See State v. Limb, 581
P.2d 142,144 (Utah 1978) (automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies where
"there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is movable,
the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must
be obtained") (quoted with apparent approval in Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470).
However this concept develops in this state, it is likely to be less clear than federal
standards. Utah already suffers from a relatively paucity of published case authority. See
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568,570 n.l (Utah 1991). In contrast, federal search and seizure
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principles are subject to interpretation by at least a dozen federal courts of appeal, hundreds
of federal district court judges, and the state courts in all the states. This generates a body of
case law that can be much more readily applied, even when the United States Supreme Court
announces a new constitutional principle.
Deterrence from an independent state exclusionary rule is also unlikely for another
reason. Then-Professor Oaks explained that deterrence is implausible where there are
"competing norms of police behavior." Oaks, supra, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. at 727. Oaks cited
several studies that reported police officers often felt justified in violating search and seizure
principles. Such competing police norms seem particularly likely to develop where the
United States Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned the officer's behavior.
A final reason for the lack of deterrent effect to independent state rales is the
possibility of avoiding the state rules by "going federal." It appears to be a generally
accepted principle of the deterrence literature that certainty of punishment is an important
factor in establishing a sanction's deterrent effect. Yet state law enforcement officers who
obtain evidence in violation of an independent state constitutional rule remain free to use that
same evidence in a federal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489
(10th Cir. 1992). Many serious crimes violate both federal and state criminal laws. See, e.g.,

' For example, the Larocco plurality criticized the Supreme Court's decision in
California v. Carney, All U.S. 386 (1985). Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469. Yet whatever its
faults, Carney generated discussion in at least 75 places in published opinions in just its first
three years, including references in 10 federal circuits and 17 states (Utah among them). See

12 SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS (Supp. 1986-88) (cases citing Carney).
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United States v. Bryan David Mitchell and Wanda Eileen Barzee, No. 2:08-CR-125 (D. Utah
2008) (federal indictment charging federal kidnapping charges in Elizabeth Smart case,
paralleling state charges). It seems likely that this possibility of state officers serving
illegally seized evidence to federal authorities on a "silver platter"14 undercuts the deterrent
effect of any independent state exclusionary rule.
C. A State Exclusionaiy Rule is Likely to Operate in Situations Where it is
Disproportionate to the Constitutional Violation
The federal exclusionary rule has been criticized because of the disparity between the
"offense" of an insubstantial constitutional violation and the "penalty" of releasing a guilty
criminal. The classic statement of the critique comes from Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
Bivens, where he argued that although "[fjreeing either a tiger or a mouse in a schoolroom is
an illegal act,... no rational person would suggest that these two acts should be punished in
the same way." Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 419 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
He concluded that "society has [a] right to expect rationally graded responses from
judges in place of the universal 'capital punishment5 we inflict on all evidence when police
error is shown in its acquisition." Id. at 419. This Court, too, has also recognized that
exclusion of evidence can be a disproportionate sanction in some instances. See, e.g., State v.
Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Utah 1987) ("suppression of evidence obtained as a result of

14

Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (repudiating then-existing "silver
platter" doctrine which allowed evidence illegally seized by state officials in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to be used in federal courts).
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Guinnfs illegal investigation would be a remedy out of all proportion to the benefits gained to
the end of obtaining justice while preserving individual liberties unimpaired") (internal
citation omitted).
This criticism has lead to several proposals for reforming the exclusionary rule. For
example, the American Law Institute (ALI) has suggested limiting the rule to situations
involving a "substantial" violation of a constitutional right. See MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Proposed Official Draft 1975) § SS 290.2. In contrast, the
great irony about Utah's exclusionary rule is that it will operate only in those situations
where the suppression of evidence is likely to be a disproportionate response to the
constitutional violation. Utah's independent state exclusionary rule functions exclusively in
areas where the United States Supreme Court has approved the law enforcement conduct in
question. In other words, it takes effect only in circumstances where reasonable minds can
differ — specifically, where at least five justices of the United States Supreme Court have
found the search or seizure to be "reasonable" and thus constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.
On the other hand, the "cost" of applying the exclusionary rule in these situations is
the suppression of reliable evidence with the possible, if not probable, consequence of the
release of a guilty criminal - something of special concern to amicus Utah Council on
Victims of Crime. Thus, in Larocco, the state was unable to retry Larocco, and a car thief
escaped justice; and in Thompson, the state could not retry the two defendants, who had been
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convicted of five counts of bribery, one count of antitrust violation, and one count of
racketeering, and they went free as well. See Cassell, supra, 1993 Utah L. Rev. at 849.
In short, Utah's exclusionary rule will generally produce unjust results. It will come
into play only when the police conduct has been approved by the United States Supreme
Court; and yet the sanction will be the "single, monolithic, and drastic judicial response"
Bivens v. Six Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), of
suppression of reliable evidence - leaving the general public and crime victims to bear the
costs.
CONCLUSION
This Court should abolish the independent state exclusionary rule. Doing so would
greatly reduce the litigation involving article I, section 14, as criminal defendants would no
longer have standing to raise state constitutional claims in criminal cases - including
defendants like appellant Walker. Abolishing the exclusionary remedy, however, would in
no way eliminate this Court's ability to independently interpret article I, section 14. All that
would change is the remedy for enforcing the right. Instead of suppressing reliable evidence
of the guilt of criminals, the state constitutional right could be enforced in traditional ways such as civil and administrative remedies. See generally Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAHL. REV.
849-58 (discussing alternatives to the suppression of evidence for enforcing the state search
and seizure provision). These are the same remedies that courts use to enforce other pans of
the Utah Constitution, such as article I, § 15's protection of freedom of speech and of the
press and article I, § 4's protection of religious liberty. If traditional remedies work to secure
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these precious constitutional liberties, they should likewise secure the rights found in article
I, section 14.
Indeed, if anything, reliance on the exclusionary rule has led to underprottction of
state constitutional rights. This Court has focused exclusively on exclusionary remedies to
enforce article I, section 14. Cf. State v. Hygh, 111 P.2d at 273 (Zimmerman, J., concurring)
("This Court has never considered the appropriateness of possible exceptions to the
exclusionary rule or the availability of alternative or supplemental remedies . . . ."). By
definition, the exclusionary rule can provide redress only to guilty criminals who seek to
exclude evidence of their guilt in criminal trials; the rule does nothing for innocent persons
whose rights have been violated. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles\
107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1994) (Under the federal exclusionary7 rule, "criminal go free,
while honest citizens are intruded upon in outrageous ways with little or no real remedy.").
Indeed, the sad fact is that the state exclusionary rule has effectively transformed article I,
section 14, from a right of all the people of the state into a right that exclusively protects
those involved in crimes. This is not a result envisioned by either the drafters of Utah's
Constitution or the state's contemporary elected representatives.
For the foregoing reasons, amicus Utah Council on Victims of Crime respectfully
requests the Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court on the grounds that article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution does not permit the exclusion of reliable evidence.
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